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Chapter I 
The Universal Good 
No Greek thinker after Plato could afford to neglect a consider-
ation of the good; the very emphasis which the Academy under its first 
master had placed upon the Idea of the Good introduced into Greek thought, 
if not a new concept, at least a very definite~hilosophical problem, namely, 
what the good is. Aristotle begins his Nichomaohean Ethics with a statement 
of what he took to be the common aoceptation of the good: "Every art and 
every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at 
some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that 
at which all things aim. ,,1 But even though any thinker may well have agreed 
that the good may be understood as "that at which all things aim," this mere 
generalization could not serve to distinguish from the opinions of others his 
own view of what the good is and what role it plays in reality as a whole •. ~ 
In the case of Aristotle the significance of this description crystallizes a 
wealth of his own philosophical thought on the problem of the good that he 
inherited from the Platonists. 
Where his own philosophic opinions are solutions of problems that 
had be~p faced by other thinkers, it is customarily in their contrast to the 
. 
answers advanced by the others that he presents them; and it is largely 
against the background of the Platonic theory of the Ideas that he philo so-
phizes. Particularly in his solution of the problem which we propose here 
to discuss is this true. As far as the nature of the good is concerned, 
1 
I 
2 
namely, what it is by reason of which things are called good, the ~'onoept of 
"that at which a11 things aim" might just as we11 apply to the Platonic Good; 
for, so understood. it may be taken, on the one hand, as merely the good-in-
general or, on the other, as some one and the same universal and subsistent 
;. .Q 
Good such as Aristotle considered the Platonists to mean. 
It does not agree with his ovm thought, however, to accept the 
latter interpretation of the nature of the goot for the reason that no 
universal can be a substance in the precise fashion in which he interpreted 
the Platonists to mean it. Although the term "substance" may admit of 
various usages, Aristotle holds that "substance, in the truest and primary 
and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predioable of 
a subjeot nor present is a subjeot,"2 whereas everything else other than 
substance lacks one or both of these characteristios.3 Aristotle allows 
that the term be applied to those universals signifying the species of the 
genera into which the primary substanoes fall;4 but, properly speaking, 
those things are oalled substances which underlie everything else either as 
the subject in which all other things are present or as the subject of whioh 
they are predicated.5 
These characteristics of primary substanoe are clearly in 
Aristotle's mind when he comes to the explicit examination of whether any 
universal can be a substanoe. The very universality signified by a uni-
versal term, as opposed to the singularity of the primary substanoe, makes 
a subsistent universal impossible. The individuality proper to substance 
means precisely that the substance of a thing belongs to nothing else but to 
I 
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that thing of which it is the substance. The universal, on the co~trary, is 
common to many individuals of the same class and belongs exclusively to none. 
If it is to be a substance, it will be the substanoe either of all or of none 
of the members of the olass. For to oall it the substanoe of one member only 
is to identify that member with every other~~a single individual. The 
universal, on the supposition that it is a substanoe, would be predioated 
alike of all its individuals and would thus belong to every other member in 
.. 
the same way that it belongs to that of whioh it is supposed to be the sub-
stanoe, namely, as the substance; but things possessing an identical sub-
stanoe oonstitute, in virtue of the faot that substanoe belongs alone to that 
of whioh it is the substanoe, a numerical identity. But by the same token, 
neither oan the universal be the substanoe of all the individuals of a olass, 
for then it could be peculiar to no individual as its sUbstanoe.6 Further-
more, even the fact that the uni verss.l is predioable of anything whatever 
denies it primary substantiality.7 As a universal predicate, moreover, it 
indicates not a "this" or a primary substanoe, but rather a "such" or a 
quality. 8 
Aristotle sums up his position when he applies the argument to the 
universals "being" and "unity": 
In general nothing that is oommon is substanoe; for sub-
stance does not belong to anything but to itself and to 
that whioh has it, of whioh it is the substanoe. Further, • 
that whioh is one oannot be in many plaoes at the same 
time, but that whioh is oommon is present in many plaoes 
at the same time; so that olearly no universal exists 
apart from its individuals. 9 
This is precisely his objection to the subsistent universal Ideas or Forms 
of the Platonists. The Ideas must be considered to be substanoes sinoe 
I 
4 
their participants share in them as in something not predicated of4'a subject, 
that is, as in an individual;IO and if they are substances, it is right to 
grant them separate existence. ll But the difficulty is how they can be 
allowed subsistence if the "one-over-many", the character common to several 
individuals, is the Form. This would make tht universal to exist apart from 
its individuals, and thus would follow the impossibility of a substance and 
that of which it is the substance having existence apart from each other. 12 
.. 
The difficulties13 attendent upon substantializing a universal term are in-
escapable in the Aristotelian thought. Substantiality and universality are, 
in a sense, inversely proportionate. 14 Taking substance in the strict sense, 
however, if anything is a substance in this way, it cannot be a universal in 
any sense; and, per contra, if anything is universal, it cannot be a sub-
stance. The universal subsistent Good of the Platonists falls under the 
same criticism as the other Ideas. As a matter of fact, to Aristotle the 
Idea of the Good would have even a less valid claim to substantiality than 
the universal representing a species or genus of substance; for at least the 
latter, and especially species, constitutes the appropriate definition in 
which the primary substance falls and by that token alone is allowed to be 
considered substance. 15 
The universal good, therefore, which Aristotle accepts as the 
object of aim cannot be a subsistent entity. Rather it is merely the.uni-
versal conception that applies in common to those things which, as being 
desirable, are good; and, in consequence, it possesses, not the unity of a 
primary substance, but merely a logical unity. 
I 
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Chapter II 
Predication of the Good 
The logical unity of the universal good by virtue of whioh it is 
predicated of those things that are good giye~ rise to the further question 
. ..., 
of the manner in whioh it is predicated of them. Many things whose very 
mode of being are different are called "good." The term "good" is attributed 
to all those beings which the Platonists call~ participants in the Idea of 
the Good; but the fact that those beings do not belong to the same genus of 
being presents the problem of whether or not "good" is applied to all of 
them with the same meaning in each case. 
In this question it is in his antithesis to the Platonic view that 
Aristotle takes up the problem and subjects the Idea of the Good to criticism 
preoisely on the point that it must be predicated in the same sense or uni-
vocally of all things that are called good by participation in it. For 
Aristotle considers the proponents of the theory of the Ideas to have post~ 
lated the Ideas set over classes of things in which they admitted no priority 
and posteriority in the respect in which the individual of any class belonged 
to it and shared in the Idea of it.l But "good", on the other hand, falls I 
into all the categories; it has as many senses as "being." It is applied, 
for example, in the category of substance to God and to reason, in that of 
quantity to the moderate amount, in that of quality to the virtues, in that 
of relation to the useful, in that of time to the opportune, in that of plaoe 
to the right locality. It follows, therefore, that there is no universal 
Good univocally predicable of all goods; for substance, the ~~ existent, 
6 
is prior in nature, for example, to what is only relative. 2 In consequence, 
the good would have a prior and posterior sense in being predicated of things 
which are in their natures prior or posterior in respect to one another. If. 
on the contrary, the good were taken as univooal, it would have to be predi-
cable in only a single category; and the ablu1d consequenoe would follow 
that things falling into the other categories could not be oalled good.S 
In this criticism of Plato, Aristotle comes closest to the explicit ,. 
solution of the problem involved in the predication of "good." He begins the 
Nichomachean Ethics with a consideration of what the good-in-general means, 
and he makes the nature of the good the occasion for his oriticism of the 
Ideal Good because the latter was considered to be universal and not 
restricted to ethical matters. ~e had perhaps better consider the universal 
good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it,"4 he begins and apologizes 
for his attack on his former master and fellows; but though his criticism 
establishes the impossibility of an univocal universal good, he hardly oon-
siders the problem adequately treated. When the consideration of the uni-
versal good has served its purpose, he dispenses with it. "What then," he 
asks, "do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that only 
chanoe to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from 
one good or by all oontributing to one good, or are they rather one by 
analogy? •••• But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the 
present; for perfect precision about them would be more appropriate to 
another branch of philosophy."5 
Considering that "good" predicates in the same fashion as "being", 
Aristotle's own answer to the question is the second alternative named; that 
I 
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is, "good" is predicated by analogy or proportion. The branch of 1>hilosophy 
to which he refers a more accurate solution of the question is evidently ,the 
Metaphysics where the predication of "being", but not explicitly "good", is 
oonsidered in various contexts. The "senses of being" of which he makes use 
in his analysis are the categories. While "i-;" belongs to all things that 
can be said to be, it answers to various senses in respect of the way they 
are. Primarily and in a simple sense it beloIljs to ·substance; and only 
secondarily and in a limited sense it belongs to quantity, quality, relation, 
and the other categories. For substance is prior to the other senses of 
"being", firstly, in definition because it must enter into the definition of 
the others, secondly, in knowledge because a thing is known in the strictest 
sense by what it is rather than by the acoidental features that it possesses, 
and thirdly, in time beoause all the other things have their being only in 
substanoe. Consequently, substanoe alone ~ by no mere ambiguity; but with 
the other oategories the case is different. In regard to them, it is like 
the use of "is" in the case of that which "is not," as some say, with 
emphasis on the linguistic form, that what is not ~, not is simply but is 
non-existent. 6 
... 
How, then, may it be said that "being" is predicated of all the 
categories, recognizing that it has prior and posterior significations 
corresponding to the priority or posteriority of the thing of which i~ is 
predicated? The truth is, Aristotle points out, that we do not mean the 
same thing in each case nor do we mean different things; that is, the pre-
dication is neither univocal nor equivooal. 7 Rather, "being" is predicated 
in virtue of a referenoe ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ thing. The case is the same as 
I 
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the predication of "healthy" or "medical." Everything that is cal .... ed 
"healthy" is so called by a proportion to one central point, that is, health, 
as being, for example, preservative, productive, symptomatic, or capable of 
health. Everything called "medical" is likewise so called in virtue of its 
reference to a common end, as, for exe.mple,·p~ssessing the medical art, 
exercising it, being adapted to it, or being a function of it. "Health" 
itself and the "medical art" itself are called, "healthy" and "medical" 
.. 
respectively, primarily and without such qualifioations or such referenoes. 
In the case of "being" substance is the central point of referenoe which is 
said to be simply, whereas all other things!!! by referenoe to substanoe. 
"Some things," Aristotle says in illustrating the point, "are said to be 
because they are substances, others because they are affeotions of substanoe, 
others because they are a prooess toward substanoe, or destructions or pri-
vations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, 
~r of things that are relative to substance, or negations of one of these 
things or of substance itself."S 
The case, as Aristotle has indicated, stands the same with the 
predication of "good." Its prior and posterior signifioations, correspond -
ing to those of "beings", accounts for the fact that it is predioated neither 
univocally nor equivocally.9 It is, therefore, like "being", an analogous 
term; every sense of "good" is referred to what is good in the striot&St 
sense, namely, substanoe. Just as individuals in the oategories of quantity. 
or quality, or relation, or the others are not unless they are quantities, 
qualities, or relations of a substanoe, so neither are such goods as the 
moderate amount, or the virtuous, or the useful, good unless they are the 
I 
9 
.' moderate amount for a substanoe, the virtue of a substanoe, the useful to a 
substance. 
I 
10 
Chapter III 
The Good as Cause 
The notion of the good as a cause in Aristotle's thought is implied 
in the statement that it is that at which aII~things aim, for then it appears 
as identified with the end considered as the final cause of any motion what-
ever; and it follows also from this conception, that the good. as a cause, is 
.. 
pre-eminent &nong the causes. The four causes make their first explicit 
appearance in the Metaphysics as the starting-point and frwmework of the 
exwmination and criticism of the thought of previous philosophers in their 
search for principles and causes; and here the final cause is represented 
as "the purpose and the good, II to which Aristotle adds by way of explanation 
"for this is the end of all generation and change."l Throughout the sub-
sequent critioism whenever he turns expressly to the oonsideration of the 
final oause in previous philosophy, he retains the same oonoeption: in 
relation to those who posited more than a material cause, he oalls it "that 
for whose sake aotions and changes and movements take plaoe;"2 and in rela-
tion to the Platonists, he oalls it "that for whose sake both all mind and 
the whole of nature are operative."3 This oonneotion with the field of 
ohange establishes the good as a motive principle in all ohange, but a 
prinoiple whioh, as aimed at, exeroises its oausality at both terms o~ the 
motion. For it is the ~, but only in the sense in whioh that term is em-
ployed to denote the final oause or purpose of the motion. In a disoussion 
of the meaning of the term "limit" Aristotle makes this distinction by point-
ing out that one of the senses of "limit" is equivalent to "the end of the 
I 
11 
thing" which_ in general_ means only a last stage towards which m~ment and 
action are and not that ~ which they are; he adds, however, "sometimes it 
is both, that trom which and that to which the movement is_ i.e. the tinal 
oause."4 Thus, he excludes trom purposive aotion, that is, aotion done for a 
good, those movements owing to chance and slJ'o~aneit' which oan be said to 
oome to an end in the sense of a last stage, but not beoause ~ the end as 
the limiting point at whioh the motion is aimed from its initiation.6 As the 
• limit taken in this sense_ the good is attained in the completion of the 
motion, "for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. 1t7 
The kind ot oausality whioh the good exeroises, oonsidered as both the begin-
ning and the end of the motion_ is that of a prinoiple of motion whioh is it-
self unmoved. 
Moreover, the good, considered in its relation to the other oauses, 
is pre-eminently the oause of causes. When all things which can be oalled 
oauses in the primary and non-acoidental sense of the term are oonsidered, 
they tall into the four familiar divisionsl those whioh are substratum, those 
whioh are the essenoe, those whioh are the souroe of motion or rest, and 
finally those remaining whioh are the end. These last, however, Aristotle 
says_ "are oauses as the ~ and the good of the other things; tor that tor 
the sake of whioh other things are tends to be the best and the end of the 
other things. nS And in a parallel disoussion he repeats of the thing&whioh 
are final oauses: "The others are oauses in the sense of the end or the good 
of the rest; for 'that for the sake of whioh' means what is best and the end 
of the things that lead up to it. n9 
It is the faot that the end is a first principle or oause that 
I 
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allows the good to enter at all into metaphysical inquiry, which i,'concerned 
with the principles and causes of all things; and it is the causal pre-emi-
nence of the good which gives to Wisdom its architectonio oharaoter over all 
sciences: 
The science which knows to what en~~ach thing must be done 
is the most authoritative of the soienoes, and more author-
itative than any anoillary soience; and this end is the good 
of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole 
of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, 
[soil. that the wise man pursues his~oience for its own 
sake and orders but is not ordered] the name in question 
[soil. Wisdom] falls to the same soienoe; this must be a 
soienoe that investigates the first prinoiples and oauses; 
for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the oauses. lO 
It is, moreover, the same pre-eminenoe of the good whioh makes Politios the 
most arohiteotonio of all the arts inasmuoh as the art whioh orders whatever 
is done in the state is the art whioh is oonversant with the highest good of 
man. 11 And, in general, where many arts fall under the same capacity, it is 
the master art whioh determines the end for each of the inferiors. 12 More-
over, where the unity of the first philosophy appears as a matter for dis- ~ 
pute, Aristotle argues, on one side of the question, that if there is a 
scienoe oorresponding to each of the oauses, in one sense Wisdom ought to be 
that which deals with the good preoisely from the fact that it is the most I 
authoritative of the scienoes and that the good is the oause for the sake of 
whioh the other oauses are. lS 
Yet, on the other hand, the nature of the good as a principle whose 
oausality is exeroised over moving things is the very reason why, in regard 
to the offioe of Wisdom to investigate the oauses of ~ things, the diffi-
culty as to its unity should ocour at all. As Aristotle puts the problem: 
There are many things to whioh not all the principles 
pertain. For how can a principle of change or the natur~' 
of the good exist for Q~changeable things, since every-
thing that in itself and by its own nature is good is an 
end, and a cause in the sense that for its sake the other 
things both come to be and are, and since an end or pur-
pose is the end of some aotion, and all aotions imply 
change? So in the oase of unohangeable things this prin-
oip1e oou1d not exist.14 
13 
This conoeption of the good as a motive cause and its oonsequent 
inseparability from the field of motion in which its final causality is 
exeroised gives Aristotle further reason for r~eoting a subsistent Good as 
a Platonic Idea. The Ideas of the P1atonists he finds incapable of being a 
prinoiple or cause in any sense whatever, but particularly does he find them 
to fail to account for the universal phenomenon of change in peroeptib1e 
things. To be sure, it was in seeking the cause of peroeptib1e things, the 
causes both of their being and their beooming, that the Platonists were led 
to posit the existence of subsistent and universal Forms; but the mode of 
causality which they were thought to exercise in respect to sensible sub-
stances, "sharing" or "partioipation", is to Aristotle so muoh empty talk.la. 
For Forms, considered in their oharacter as subsistent entities apart from 
the partioular things of which they are said to be the oauses, are not causes 
in any of the usual senses of "from. n16 This means to Aristotle that they I 
fail as prinoip1es both of the being and of the becoming of things; for the 
senses in which a thing is said to come from another are exhausted by the 
four primary kinds of oausality, material and formal, effioient and final, 
whioh are adequate to acoount for both being and becoming, and by two second-
ary senses, that in which a thing is said to come from the whole if it is an 
effect of the part in anyone of the first four senses, and that which applies 
to the sucoessive parts of a temporal sequence. 17 Aristotle does not allow 
14 
that the mode of "partioipation" oorresponds to any of these literltl and 
intelligible senses. To say that anything oomes from the Idea as from a 
"pattern" is no more than a poetioal metaphor; for evidently one thing may 
be or beoome like another without having been patterned after it# whether or 
not one oalls that other eternal. 18 The restit of attempting to explain 
peroeptibles by subsistent and universal oauses is that the Platonists have 
given up the searoh for the oauses of peroepti~le things.19 In the first 
plaoe# a universal oause does not exist; the individual is oaused by the 
individual # in the sense of matter, form# and agent. 20 In the second place, 
even if the Forms do exist as universals, they fail to oontribute effioienoy 
in regard to being and beooming. For the individual has its form and oomes 
to have its form, at least in produots of nature, by the aotivity of an agent 
specifically the same as its effect and adequate to causing the form to be in 
another matter; oonsequently the Ideas would still neoessitate an agent for 
the things whioh are said to share in them. 21 If the Forms were supposed to 
be ~ particulars as well as being subsistent apart from them, they might be 
thought to be causes as entering into a composition, as white oauses white-
ness in the white objeot; but even this view is impossible. 22 
But if subsistent universal Ideas fail to explain the being and 
becoming of things either as material, formal, or efficient oauses, no less 
are they useless as final oauses. Aristotle points out that the IdeaS'in 
general have no oonnection with the final cause, namely, "that for whose sake 
both all mind and the whole of nature are operative.,,23 As for the Idea of 
the Good, the Platonists indeed oall the good a prinoiple; but how it exer-
oises its causality, whether as an end, an agent, or a form, they do not 
I 
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say.24 Rather, they really make the good a oause per aooidens, no.less than 
had Empedooles and Anaxagoras whose "friendship" and "reason", respeotively, 
were olassed as goods. "That for whose sake aotions and ohanges and move-
ments take plaoe," Aristotle says of them, "they assert to be a oause in a 
way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the w¢y~n whioh it is its nature to be 
a oause •••••• It turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the 
good is a oause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only inciden-
,. -
tally. "25 That is, the good is considered a cause in the sense that the 
cause operating to bring about the effect happens to be good or has the good 
connected with it as an incidental attribute, not in the sense that it is the 
final oause for whose sake the motion takes plaoe. 26 As a matter of faot, 
the Platonists must suppose the good as a prinoiple other than and superior 
to the Forms in order to explain their own theory of partioipation; otherwise 
the question why partioular things oome to partioipate in them and why they 
do participate in them remains unanswered. 27 
On the other hand, the good whioh Aristotle insists is a motive 
prinoiple in all movements finds its causal virtue explained in his own 
theory of movement. And sinoe movement, in its broadest sense, is the pas-
sage of anything from a state of potentiality to one of actuality, 
Aristotle'S own solution lies in his conception of potency and act. 
Aristotle points out that the term "potency" may have severeJ. 
senses; but disregarding those which are potencies only by an equivocation, 
as, for example, the so-oalled "powers" of figures in geometry, all potencies 
are originative souroes of some kind, and each is called a potency by refer-
ence to what is primarily the meaning of the term. Potency in its primary 
I 
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signification extends only to those things which involve a referen8e to 
motion, and thus its strictest sense applies to what is an "originative 
source of change in another thing or in the thing itself ~ other.,,28 The 
act of building, for instance, is a potency or a source of change which 
exists in something other than the thing bei~g~built, that is, in the agent 
who possesses the productive knowledge or the art of building by which he 
builds; the art of healing is a potency or a source of change in the doctor 
• 
who heals himself, but the potency is in him as something other than himself 
~ healed, that is, in him as the agent who has the practical knowledge or 
the medical art by which he heals. 29 Other senses of potency relate to this 
sense. Thus, potency is likewise an originative source of a thing's being 
changed by another or by itself qua other. Bricks and stones, for example, 
have a potency for being changed into a house by the art of building exer-
cised by the builder; the potency for being healed is in the doctor who heals 
himself, but it is in him not insofar as he is the agent or healer, but inso-
far as he is the patient or the healable. These two senses of potenoy, of 
aoting on another and of being acted on by another, agree in that both are 
capacities. The difference is that the active potenoy resides in the agent 
and the passive potency resides in the patient. Moreover, each potenoy 
whether in the agent or the patient is a capacity for acting or suffering in 
the manner proper to it. An agent has the capacity of heating or building 
because it has heat or the art of building by which it can heat or can build; 
a patient has the potency of being burned or of being crushed because it is 
oily or yielding in a certain way.30 
Actuality, on the other hand, is correlative to potency; and when 
I 
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Aristotle oomes to desoribe it, he says that it is the "existenoe 8f a thing 
not in the way which we express by 'potentially,II31 The way in whioh potenoy 
and actuality are to be known is not by definition, but by their proportion 
to each other; and he illustrates the proportion by ohoosing particular oases 
in which, he notes, potenoy will be found t; ixtend further than to that 
whose nature it is to move another or be moved by another. Aotuality is to 
potency as the builder building is to the builder capable of building, as the 
.. 
thing awake to the thing asleep, as the seer exeroising his sight to the seer 
with his eyes shut, as that whioh is shaped out of the matter to the matter 
----- --------
unshaped, as that whioh is wrought to that which is unwrought. In conse-
quence, aotuality and potenoy are terms which themselves are used analogous-
lye For the aotual is said of that which exists as form to matter and of 
that which exists as movement to the capacity for movement. 32 
The relation of proportionality represented respeotively by the 
actual and the potential gives rise to the question of priority and posteri-
... 
ority beoause wherever the analogy or proportion of several things occurs, it 
is a question of reference of one thing to another and of the central point 
to whioh the referenoe is made. For Aristotle, the problem, in one aspeot, 
at least, is whioh of the two divisions of being in question oan be called 
"oomplete" relative to the other, inasmuch as from the point of view of 
nature or "substantiality," that is, relative sufficienoy of being,33 the 
complete is prior to the inoomplete. When Aristotle oonsiders the question 
on this basis, he establishes the priority of the aotual over the potential 
from the standpoint of the final oause or the good. An analysis of becoming 
shows that the posterior in the process of beooming is prior in nature 
I 
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because that which is in the process of beooming has not yet its ferm where-
as, on the contrary, the form is present at the realization of the prooess in 
the completely constituted being. For everything that moves moves toward an 
end for the sake of which the movement is, and the aotuality at which the 
movement aims is the end or the good.34 
The actual, then, is the complete reality; and by this line of 
reasoning it appears as such from its nature as the final cause. Potency is, 
• 
on the other hand, inoomplete reality relative to its proper actuality and is 
made oomplete by its actualitye The argument, Aristotle points out, applies 
to actuality in the sense both of the actual as form to matter~5 and of the 
actual as movement to the oapaoity"for movement, that is, in those oases 
where the end is realized in the movement itself. For Aristotle draws the 
distinction sharply between aotive potencies whose exercise he calls "move-
ments" and those whose exeroise he oalls "aotualities", and the basis of the 
distinction is the end for the sake of whioh each exists. In the common and 
~ 
strict sense of the term, potency refers to the oapaoity of a being to move 
another or to be moved by another ~ other, and thus also actuality in its· 
oo~mon acceptation is identified with movement or the realization of this 
potency. That is why movement is commonly denied to non-existent things such 
as the objects of thought and desire; for if they were moved, they would have 
to be called actual. Aristotle himself does not aocept the identification of 
actuality with movement, for movement as suoh is inoomplete. Rather, he dis-
tinguishes "movements", properly so-called, whose end or actuality is real-
ized in a produot apart from the movement itself, from movements properly 
called "actualities" in which the end is present in and realized simultaneous-
I 
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ly with the movement itself. Making thin~ wa1king~ learning, buil~1ng are 
examples of the former. These activities have a limit in the effeot they 
are intended to produoe; none of them is in the strictest sense an end in 
itself, but all are relative to the end for which they are exeroised. The 
removing of fat, for example, is relative t~ the end of thinness in the 
bodily parts, which is not achieved while the process is going on~ but whioh~ 
when aohieved, is the point at whioh the proce~s is complete and at which the 
• 
movement is said to have attained is actuality. So, too~ with others of this 
kind; all of them are realized in the thing being produced. "The actuality," 
Aristotle says, "is in the thing that is being made, e.g. the art of building 
is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is 
being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement 1s 
in the thing that is being moved."36 On the other hand, such aotivities as 
seeing, understanding, theorizing, thinking~ living, being happy are move-
ments which have no such limit and whose end is the movement itself. "At the 
same time," Aristotle explains, ~e are seeing and have seen, are understand-
ing and have understood, are thinking and have thought •••••• At the same time 
we are living well and have lived well, are happy and have been happy. If 
not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the prooess of making 
thin oeases: but, as things are, it does not oease; we are living and have 
lived. u37 The differenoe, then, between the aotualization of the two ~inds 
of active potenoies lies in the manner in whioh the end is present to each. 
In produotions,whether of art or nature, the end is outside the agent and 
the aotuality is ~ the produot, and, this being so, they are inoomplete; in 
the other aotivities in whioh no produot is aimed at outside of the aotivi-
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ties themselves l the end is in the agent and the movement is compl~te in its 
very exercise. In this much l where the action is the end l the movement is 
properly an "actualitY"1 and Aristotle notes that "even the word tactuality~ 
is derived from 'action'. and points to complete reality.n38 
Thus it is that the actuality whic~~s the complete reality exist-
ing at the term of any movement l whether it be the result of the realization 
of a capaoity to reoeive or to aot, or, in the ,latter case, whether it be the 
• 
term of a "movement" in the proper sense or of an "aotuality", is the end or 
the good for whioh the movement exists and for which it is initiated. It is 
in the attainment of the actuality proper to the potency of its being, then, 
that a thing is said to be complete in respect of having attained its end and 
thereby is said to be good. 
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Chapter IV 
Nature and the Good 
The priority of that whioh has its end or its good over that whioh 
..... laoks it, of the realized over the unrealized, of the oomplete over the in-
oomplete, in short, of the aotual over the potential, is at the basis o£ the 
emphasis whioh Aristotle plaoes upon the £unotlon of any being, that whereby 
it attains the £ul£illment of its potentialities. 
Matter exists in a potential state, just beoause it may 
oome to its form, and when it exists aotuallz, then it 
is in its form. And the same holds good in all oases, 
even those in whioh the end is a movement. And so, as 
teaohers think they have aohieved their end when they 
have exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise. l 
When Aristotle undertakes an inquiry into nature, it is preoisely from the 
point of view of the natural thing's funotion, the prooesses whereby eaoh 
thing realizes its good in the aotualizations of its potentialities; for the 
exeroise of the funotion is the exhibition of the thing's nature: 
What a thing is is always determined by its funotion: a 
thing really is itself when it oan perform its funotion; 
an eye, for instanoe, when it oan see. When a thing oan-
not do so it is that thing only in name, like a dead eye 
or one made of stone, just as a wooden saw is no more a 
saw than one in a pioture •••••• They all [soil. natural 
things] are what they are in virtue of a oertain power 
of aotion or passion. 2 
For sinoe all originative sources are potenoies, the nature of a thing'as an 
originative souroe falls into the genus o£ potenoy;3 and it is the nature of 
a thing whioh exhibits the thing to be what it is preoisely in its natural 
funotions, preoisely in the prooesses whereby it aohieves the good pro,per to, 
it.4 
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Aristotle defines nature as "~ souroe ~ oause ~ being ~oved ~ 
2! being ~ ~..!!!. ~ ~ whioh ~ belongs primarily, in virtue of itself 
and not in virtue of' a oonoomitant attribute. "5 But when he oomes to the 
aotual determination of' what the prinoiple of motion in the natural thing is, 
he finds that "nature" may be understood in1n~ than a single sense.6 Mat-
ter, indeed, was considered to be the nature of the thing by all those think-
ers who posited elements of one sort or another, for matter is that out of ,. 
whioh the natural objeot is made or of whioh it consists and that which per-
sists in all ohanges. Aristotle, however, oonsiders the nature of a thing 
to be primarily its form, "f'or a thing is more properly said to be what it is 
when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially,"7 and 
the things that come to be and are by nature are not yet said to have their 
nature Itunless they have their form or shape. itS On the other hand, things 
are not striotly works of nature nor, indeed, of art if they are only poten-
tially natural or artistio things; rather, matter oan be oalled "nature" 
because it has the potenoy of reoei~ng the form,9 beoause, in other words, 
as a passive potenoy, it is a prinoiple of ohange in natural substanoes. 
The aotuality, then, that is possessed by the natural being in 
virtue of whioh it is properly said to be natural or to have a nature is the 
. form; and just as the aotuality or the oomplete reality in general is the end 
or the good, so likewise is the form the end with respeot to the natural sub-
stanoe whioh is oomposed of matter and form. For while the oauses are four 
in number, matter, form, agent and end, in the oase of things whioh oause 
motion by being themselves moved, form and agent and end coincide. The form 
is the effioient oause inasmuoh as the natural being produces by virtue of 
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its nature or form an effect specifically the same as itself. It 1's, more 
important, the final cause sinoe the aotuality for the sake of whioh any 
natural thing exeroises the functions proper to its active and passive poten-
cies is the form itself either as the actualization of another's passive 
potency, considered from the point of view ;f~he patient receiving the form, 
or as the aotualization of its own active potency, considered from the point 
of view of the agent communicating the fonn. lO 
• 
The major role of the form, then, is precisely the end or the good 
in respeot of natural substanoes. The matter is the passive potency which 
receives its actuality from the form;ll and the form, as giving aotuality to 
the matter, is pre-eminently the good, for it is actual existenoe in the form 
at which matter may be said to aim. l2 The form, oonsidered in its aotive 
potentiality, is the agent that efficiently initiates any ohange; but inas-
muoh as the final reason of its aotivity is to give aotuality to the matter 
or, in general, to any other being having the oapaoity reoeptive of the form, 
~ 
the form is the good, whioh finally originates the movement and determines 
the limit of the process. That is why Aristotle says, oonoerning the dis-
tinotion of the oauses in respect of substance, that "while the effioient 
cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruotion, the final oause is 
sought in the oase of being also."13 For the agency of the form is exercised 
only so long as the movement is incomplete; but when the process has r~aohed 
its oompletion, the agenoy oeases and the end or the good for which the proo-
ess has taken plaoe is realized in the very being of the substance as a oer-
tain matter now having its form. That is the reason, likewise, that to the 
question "why" in physioal inquiry the answer in regard to final cause, 
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"because it is better thus", must admit the restriotion "not withowt qualifi-
cation, but with reference to the essential nature in eaoh case."14 For al-
though the form in general is the good of the being, and also the end of 
every motion, primarily it is the form as the nature of the thing to which 
the good of each is referred. 
Because the form of the natural substance is its end and because 
the form is the end of every natural movement, Aristotle places nature in 
• general in the class of causes that act for the sake of something. Chance 
and spontaneity, while they are likewise causes which act tor the sake ot 
something, do not, however, produoe their results either always or for the 
most part in the same way. They are rather inoidental oauses ot effects 
whioh might be brought about by intelligenoe or by nature in an invariable or 
almost invariable manner. Although they aot for the sake of something, it is 
not the result which they aotually produoe for whioh they aot. The tripod 
may have fallen in virtue of the natural tendenoy of its predominant heavy 
matter to move downward, but the faot that it fell on its teet in the posi-
tion suoh as to serve for a seat is incidental to the end for whioh it fell; 
and this result is of the kind that oould have oome to pass by the aotion of 
an agent intending it. The man engaged in oolleoting subscriptions for a 
feast may go to the market-plaoe for one of many possible reasons and, while 
there. chance to meet a friend trom whom he solicits a subscription; and this 
result could have been the real object of his going to the market-place. The 
results, then, of chance and spontaneity arise from an external cause in the 
sense that the inoidental cause of their coming about is not the cause by 
which they are normally or always effected. Nature, on the other hand, in 
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virtue of the faot that the natural substanoe acts in virtue of a ~rinciple 
within it and produces a result whioh is the proper and normal or invariable 
result for the sake of whioh it aots. is a oause whioh aots for an end~!! 
and not inoidentally.15 
From the faot of relatively invar!atle results of natural action 
Aristotle argues that natural aotion is for the sake of the end produoed and 
not the action of an inoidental and hence inde{inite oause. for the only suf-
fioient reason for the achievement of suoh effects is that the end or good is 
attained by the natural and proper aotivity of the form actualizing an appro-
priate matter. Coinoidence oannot aocount for the faot that. for example. 
the front teeth of animals are always slender and sharp for tearing food and 
the molars thick and dull for grinding it; for if the oharacter of teeth were 
the result of ohance or spontaneity and hence were not constituted as they 
are in view of the end for which they are fitted, they should neither always 
nor normally be of suoh oharaoter. lS The same is true of any coming-to-be in 
~ 
nature, as Aristotle argues against Empedooles. "for the things whioh oome-
to-be by natural process all exhibit, in their ooming-to-be, a uniformity 
either absolute or highly regular: while any exoeptions -- any results whioh 
are in aocordanoe neither with the invariable nor with the general rule --
are produots of ohance and luok. Then what is the cause determining that man 
oomes-to-be from man, that wheat (instead of an olive) oomes-to-be from 
wheat, either invariably or generally? •••• The cause in question [soil. of 
the proportions of the element in natural bodies] is the essential nature of 
eaoh thing -- not merely •••• 'a mingling and a divoroe of what has been min-
gled.,"17 The coming-to-be of natural substanoes, then. is due to the nature 
I 
26 
of each thing; and while the adherents of chance and spontaneity as'sign the 
excellence of eaoh thing to the "mingling of elements", rather nit is ~ 
~oil. the natureJ which is both 'the excellence' of each thing and its 
'good,n.lS 
The striot parallelism that AristcrtI'e finds be"t!feen the functions 
of art and nature provides another argument for the teleological activity of 
natural agents. In both art and nature the form of the 'product to be pro-
• 
duoed is that whereby the agent aots to embody the form in its appropriate 
matter. Just as man produces man and wheat produoes wheat by having the form 
of man or wheat, so does health produoe health and house produoe house; for 
the medical art and the building art are precisely the form of health and the 
form of house in the soul of the artist. These forms, like the forms of the 
natural agents, are the active potencies whereby the artist causes the same 
specifio form to be in the thing produced. In art, however, reasoning is 
involved, not on the part of the art itself, to be sure, but on the part of 
the artist. For the exeroise of the art, it is required that before the 
aotual exeroise of the artistic funotions, the artist decide upon the neces-
sary dispositions of materials and the series of means, whether aotivities or 
instruments, that will cause the form to be in matter. When his deliberation 
reaohes a point of aotion immediately within his power, he may begin the 
series that will result, if nothing hinders, in the end he has intended. 19 
The series of steps to a oompletion wherein the end or the good is effeoted 
is the same in nature as in art, each preoeding step for the sake of the next 
and all for the sake of the end at which the prooess reaches the good for 
which it was originated. 20 The series in nature is obvious in the work of 
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non-intelligent animals. for example, spiders. ants. and the like,·and even 
in plants. This teleologioal view Aristotle finally returns to its speoula-
tive basis: 
If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swal-
low makes its nest and the spider .its web, and plants grow 
leaves for the sake of the fruit andrsend their roots down 
(not up) for the sake of nourishment. it is plain that this 
kind of oause is operative in things whioh come to be and 
are by nature. And since 'nature' means two things, the 
matter and the form, of whioh the latter is the end, and 
since all the rest is for the sake 01 the end, the form 
must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of 
which. ,.,21 
It is a difficulty which arises from former physioal theories why 
natural productions might not well be thought to be the result of neoessity 
rather than teleologioal aotion. Neoessity finds its own place in Aristotle'~ 
own view of nature, but it is only a hypothetioal necessity arising from the 
part that matter plays in the oonstitution of natural substanoes. and it sub-
serves the end. A house. for example. does not come to be because certain of 
its materials tend downward to form the foundation and certain others upwar. 
to form the roof. Although the materials and the natural activities attach-
ing to their natures are necessary to the existence of the product by the 
very faot that it is a oomposite being. it is not because of them exoept as I 
the matter that the produot oomes to be. A house exists for the purpose of 
sheltering. and for that end it oomes to be. If. then, a house is to exist, 
the materials and a oertain oontinuous suooession of motions and produotions 
must exist until the produot for which they exist and are put into operation 
will be realized; for without these anteoedents the end will not be reaohed. 
The same kind of neoessity exists in nature; a man, for example. does not 
result necessarily from a certain disposition of matter or bodily parts and a 
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oertain number of natural motions, but if a man is to exist, these~ust nec-
essarily exist and produce the man. Thus Aristotle concludes his argument: 
What is neoessary then, is neoessary on a hypothesis; it 
is not a result necessarily determinedlby antecedents. 
Necessity is in the matter, while 'that for the sake of 
which' is in the definition.22 . 
•• 
Aristotle divides natural substanoes into three kinds: the elements 
and their oompounds, plants, and animals and their parts, for eaoh of these 
is possessed of the internal prinoiple require. of things existing by na-
ture. 23 To all of these kinds belong, in virtue of their forms or natures as 
the prinoiple of their movements, proper fUnotions and proper goods; the 
actuality at whioh each aims in its aotion is proportioned to the potential-
ity whioh each possesses by reason of its specifio fo~. To the elements 
belong upward and downward movement in plaoe. Movement of any kind, like the 
aotion of generation, is never fortuitous; there is no motion of a ohance 
subject in a chance direction, but only from one contrary to the other or to 
an intermediate state. "Now, that which produces upward and downward move~ 
ment," Aristotle argues, "is that which produoes weight and lightness, and 
that which is moved is that which is potentially heavy or light, and the 
movement of each body to its own plaoe is motion toward its own form."24 It I 
is only in the attainment of its proper place that the element has its own 
aotuality. ~enever," he illustrates, "air comes into being out of water, 
light out of heavy, it goes to the upper place. It is forthwith light: be-
ooming is at an end, and in that plaoe it has being. Obviously, then, it is 
a potentiality, which, in its passage to actuality, oomes into that place and 
quantity and quality which belong to its actuality.u25 Thus, the proper form 
and end or good that belongs to the elements is accomplished in the place 
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proper to each. and their natural movements are aimed toward the p}ace. 
Bodies compounded out of the elements26 likewise have movements toward their 
place, but their movements are due to their relative lightness or heaviness 
arising from the relative proportions of their elementary constituents. 27 
When Aristotle turns to the genus ·of' natural things possessed of 
life. the same causality of the form as end governs his conception of their 
activities. Living substances in nature are likewise composites of matter 
•• 
and form. namely. of body and soul; and the soul is "the first grade of 
actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."28 The soul. in 
other words. i~ the essence or formal cause of the body; for the very being 
of the living bodies is to live and "of their being and their living the soul 
in them is the cause or source."29 and the aotuality of any potenoy in the 
natural order is the fo~.30 But Nature aots for the sake of the end; and 
just as the actuality is the end or good of the potentiality, so the soul as 
the actuality of the body potential to the soul is the end or good of the 
body. 31 
It is from the point of view of the end that Ari stotle can thus 
treat of the kinds of soul which he distinguishes among living things. The 
lowest psyohic power, which belongs to all living things of the earth, "may 
be described as that which tends to maintain whatever has this power in it of 
continuing such as it was."32 but "since it is right to call things after the 
ends they realize. and the end of this soul is to generate another being like 
that in Which it is, the first soul ought to be named the reproductive 
soul."33 Thus. it is the function of this soul to realize the form of the 
living thing in matter by the exercise of its active potentiality for gener-
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ating; and it is only by reference to this good, namely, the thing~enerated, 
that the reproduotive soul is, "for that which oan make and generate, oon-
sidered simply as such, exists only in relation to what is made and gener-
t d "34 a e • 
So likewise, the teleol067 appears·in connection with living things 
which have the power of local movement. Sinoe Nature does nothing in vain, 
animals must have the power of sensation, must,ossess the next order of 
soul, namely, the sensitive; for without it they should be inoapable of 
reaching the end whioh Nature has intended for them, that is, to rise to the 
oomplete realization of their form in matter and to the exercise of their 
potentialities. It follows, by the same token, that the senses should sub-
serve this good of the animal; and thus they oontribute both to the being and 
the well-being of the animal. 35 
That ITature aot~ for a good is the fundamental oonception perVading 
the entire physioal system that Aristotle has left; and this view he himself 
summarizes explicitly with regard to biological scienoe: 
At the beginning of the inquiry we must postUlate the prin-
oiples we are aocustomed constantly to use for our scientific 
investigation of nature, that is we must take for granted 
principles of this universal character which appear in all 
Nature's work. Of these one is that Nature creates nothing 
without a purpose, but always the best possible in eaoh kind 
of living creature by reference to its essential constitu-
tion. Aocordingly if one way is better than another that is 
the way of Nature. 36 
.... 
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Chapter V 
The Ethioal Good 
.' 
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While man possesses in oammon with the elements, plants, and brutes 
the funotions proper to them in virtue of th,f'iaot that he shares their na-
tures, he presents a vastly different problem to Aristotle. For man possess-
es not the mere life of the plants and of the lower animals, but life to a 
higher degree. Alone he has a god-like nature\mose funotion it is to think 
and be wise, and "of all living beings with whioh we are aoquainted man alone 
partakes of the divine, or at any rate partakes of it in a fuller measure 
than the rest."l For man is differentiated from other natural living sub-
stanoes by the faot that he possesses the rational power of soul which is 
more divine than the reproduotive or sensitive and seems, unlike them, t~ be 
indestruotible and separable from body. If a soul has an aotion or passion 
proper to itself alone2 or if a power of the soul is not the aotuality of any 
bodily part,3 it is separable from the body; and, oonversely, if it has no ~ 
aotion or passion so proper to it or if it is the actuality of a bodily part, 
separate existence is impossible to it. But in the operations of the intel-
leotive soul of knowing in an intelleotual manner Aristotle finds the re-
quirement for separate existenoe: "Insofar as the realities it knows are 
oapable of being separated from their matter, so it is also with the powers 
of the mind. n4 The intelleotive soul, then, is an independent sUbstanoe 
inoapable of destruotion, and for this reason it is more divine than all 
other souls, differing from them preoisely as the eternal differs from the 
perishable. 5 More preoisely, it is the aoting intellect, whose essential 
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nature is activity. whioh is separable. impassive. unmixed; "this ~lone is 
immortal and eterna1."6 
Thus while man shares in the goods ot the lower substances. the 
good proper to man must be a higher good corresponding with man's higher 
nature. Even, however, if the good for man 1s"'a more divine good than that 
of any other natural being, it is with the conviction that reason and order 
exists in the whole of nature that governs Aristotle's inquiry into the 
• 
ethioal good. There must be a ohief good for man. a perfect good which he 
desires for its own sake alone and for which he desires everything else; 
otherwise the series of goods desirable for the sake of something else would 
be infinite, and man's desire would be a vanity.7 This good, then, will be 
a good achievable by action. Aristotle rejeots the Platonic subsistent Idea 
of the Good, as far as its contribution to the moral action of man is con-
cerned, preoise1y on the ground that even if it exist separately and inde-
pendently of all goods that are the object of human desire, it would be 
beyond human attainment. Moreover, even if it were considered as a kind of 
pattern by which man could be supposed to be guided in his attainment ot 
aotually aohievab1e goods, it is manifestly useless in this regard, as the 
actual prooedure of the arts attests, and it is diffiou1t to see how it is 
possible that the knowledge of a universal Good oou1d be an aid to actions 
aiming at partiou1ar goods. 8 
The good at whioh man aims must be the most final ot all ends of 
action; it must be final without qualification, that is, in no case desirable 
for the sake of something else, but always that good for whioh men do what-
ever they do; in short, it is the good under whioh all goods achievable by 
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man are subserved. It is, moreover, the self-sufficient good such~hat alone 
it makes human life desirable and laoking no good.9 To say that this good is 
happiness Aristotle finds to be platitudinous. The question still remains to 
determine what the nature of the summum bonum is; and it is by turning to the 
function peou1iar to man that he gives his a~c~unt of happiness, just as in 
all things which have undergone his scrutiny he has sought the good in their 
function. 
.. 
Just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and. 
in general, for all things that have a function or activity, 
the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, 
so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have 
the oarpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions and 
aotivities, and has man none? Is he born without a funotion? 
Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general eaoh of the parts 
evidently has a funotion, may one lay it down that man 
similarly has a funotion apart from all these?lO 
The peouliar funotion of man is a certain kind of life, sinoe he is a living 
being, but neither the life of nutrition and growth, for this is oommon to 
all living bodies, nor of peroeption, for this is common to all animals. 
Henoe, it is "an aotive life of the element that has a rational principle." 
But, "having a rational principle" is applied to the appetitive soul which is 
said to "have a rational principle" in the sense of being obedient to one, 
and to the rational soul whioh possesses one and exeroises thought. And the 
"life of the rational element" oan be understood as the first aotuality or 
the seoond aotuality.ll The function proper to man, Aristotle deoides. is 
the proper activity of the rational soul. But sinoe the rational potenoy is 
oapable of contrary effeots,l2 the good for man will reside only in an emi-
nent exeroise of his funotion in respeot of goodness. If, then, an aotion is 
well performed by the exeroise of the human funotion in accordance with the 
I 
good appropriate to the funotion, Aristotle ooncludes, the summum ~bnum is 
the "aotivity of soul in aooordance with virtue, and if there are more than 
one virtue, in aooordanoe with the best and most complete" exercised "in a 
complete life."13 
If happiness, then, is an activit;r:n accordance with virtue of the 
soul, Aristotle finds it necessary to determine the nature of virtue by ref-
erence to the soul itself. The human soul Aristotle divides into the irra-
• 
tional and that which in the primary sense is said to have a rational prin-
ciple. The former is divided into the vegetative and that which in a 
secondary sense is said to have a rational principle, inasmuch as the 
appetitive soul and, in general, the "desiring element" is seen to be 
obedient to a rational principle in the continent or temperate or brave man, 
although in the incontinent it is allowed to pursue its natural tendenoy 
contrary to the rational principle. As the irrational element can thus be 
distinguished from the point of view of its own nature as opposed to the 
rational principle and from that of its obedience to the rational, so, 
Aristotle finds, can the element having a rational principle primarily be 
said to be twofold, "one subdivision having it in the strict sense and in 
itself, and the other having a tendency to obey as one does one's father. nl4 
In consequence, the virtues corresponding to the parts distinguished in the 
rational soul can be divided into two kinds, intellectual and moral. 
In respect of the moral virtues, Aristotle determines their genus 
as states of character. Three kinds of things are found in the soul: 
passions, faoulties, and such states. But while men are oalled good or bad 
and are praised or blamed beoause of their virtues and vioes, they are not so 
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oalled nor is praise or blame imputed of them by reason of either ~eir 
passions or their faoulties; and while virtues and vioes involve choioe and 
are aoquired by aotion, passions are involuntary and faoulties are in man by 
nature. States of oharacter. on the other hand. are in man as those things 
by whioh he stands well or badly with refere~o~ to his passions and actions. 
The virtue of anything whatever is that whereby the thing is placed in good 
oondition and whereby it exercises its function in an eminent degree. Just 
• 
as the proper exoellenoe of an eye or of a horse makes the eye itself to be 
good and to see well and the horse to be itself good and to be good at its 
fUnotions of running. carrying its rider. and awaiting the enemy in battle, 
so the moral virtue of man is a state of the human oharacter that makes him 
morally good and that makes him perform his moral aotions and suffer his 
passions well. But as in works of art. exoess and defect destroy the good-
ness of the artefaot, so in human passions and actions;. a man may be ill 
disposed toward his passions by feeling them too muoh or too little or he 
may. in regard to his aotions. do too much or too little. Specifically. 
then. moral virtue lies in the mean between the vioes of exoess and defect. 
Aristotle sums up the nature of moral virtue thus: "Virtue. then. is a state 
of charaoter oonoerned with choice. lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative 
to us, this being determined by a rational prinoiple, and by that prinoiple 
by which the man of praotioal wisdom would determine it. nl5 
It is in the determination of the rational prinoiple or right rule 
whioh presoribes the intermediate to be ohosen that Aristotle is led into a 
disoussion of the intelleotual virtues. Again from the point of view of the 
soul he begins and divides the "part whioh grasps a rule or rational 
I 
36 
prinoiple" aooording to the kinds of things with whioh it deals, Lato the 
soientifio or oontemplative whioh deals with invariable things and the oal-
oulative or deliberative which deals with the variable. The best state of 
eaoh of those parts is the virtue of each, and the virtue of eaoh is relative 
to its proper funotion; but the best state o~ianything intelleotual is truth. 
Although intelleot as suoh does not relate to aotion, the best state of 
praotioal intelleot whioh aims at the end of good aotion is truth in agree-
• 
ment with right desire; for ohoioe, whioh is the effioient oause of moral 
aotion, can be oalled either "desiderative reason or ratiooinative desire." 
The proper funotion of both intellectual parts, is, therefore, truth; and 
the states whereby eaoh will attain the truth proper to it are the virtues 
of each. lS 
The state of soul by virtue of which there is truth in the praoti-
oal intelleot insofar as the right aotion of man is concerned Aristotle oalls 
praotioal wisdom, which, being neither a state of the oontemplative intelleot 
nor the state whioh governs making, is a "true and reasoned state of oapaoity 
to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.,,11 This state 
involves the ability to deliberate well about what oonduoes to the good life 
in general; it caloulates with respeot to the means whereby the end of moral 
aotions is attained, and this end is the good aotion itself.18 It is thus 
relative to the sphere of moral aotion wherein it oonsiders not only the 
universal charaoter of human aotion but partioular goods in view of the high-
est good and the particular acts whioh must be done to achieve them;19 and 
sinoe its end is what ought to be done and what ought not, its offioe is to 
issue oommands over the man in the performanoe of virtuous deeds. 20 It is 
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not, then, identioal with virtue, but in the good man it is necess~ily 
ooincident with virtue; for Aristotle says, "the work of man is achieved only 
in accordanoe with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue 
makes us aim at the right mark. and praotioal wisdom makes us take the right 
means."21 Thus, it is practioal wisdom whiot ~ormulates the practical syllo-
gism governing the moral aotions of the virtuous man. 22 As knowing the end 
at which the virtue aims and presoribing the ~ans Whereby the good is 
• 
aohieved, there can be no virtue where there is not practioal wisdom. For 
while the natural faculty of oleverness, which enables the human agent to 
aim at and hit the mark, without aoquired virtue to set the right mark may 
be employed toward a bad end, and while natural virtue without the direction 
of praotical reason is blind and may lead man astray, the acquired moral 
virtues and practical wisdom alone guarantees that the agent do virtuous 
actions out of established habit and good choice as the man who is without 
qualification good would do them. It is, therefore, evident that choice will 
not be right unless practical wisdom and moral virtue are present in the 
agent; and it is Aristotle's conclusion that "it is not possible to be good 
in the striot sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without 
moral virtue."23 
But the virtue of the oontemplative reason as well enters into 
Aristotle's consideration of the highest good for man. Philosophio wisdom 
1s the most finished form of knowledge; for it is a oombination of intuitive 
reason, which is the state of mind whioh apprehends first prinoiples,24 and 
of soientific knowledge, which is the state or capaoity to demonstrate and 
the mental possession of what cannot be otherwise than as it is, namely, 
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neoessary and therefore eternal things. 25 It is, moreover, sOientffio knowl-
edge in its most oomplete form inasmuch as it is knowledge of those objeots 
whioh are by their nature the highest; and thus philosophio wisdom transoends 
even praotioal wisdom whioh in the first place is concerned with man, who, 
• .Q 
though he is the best of animals, is still less divine than, for example, the 
heavenly bodies, and which, furthermore, is concerned not alone with univer-
sals but with particulars also. 26 While it ap~ears, then, that philosophio 
wisdom has no oonneotion with those things that will oonduoe to man's happi-
ness in so muoh as its oonoern is not for the things whioh oan be aohieved 
by man but for what is eternally what it is,27 Aristotle points out that, in 
the first plaoe, even if it oould produoe nothing, it is worthy of ohoioe as 
a virtue of the rational soul.28 But, furthermore, philosophio wisdom does 
produoe happiness, not as a produotive art in the way that medioine produoes 
health, but as the form of health produoes health in the healthy body; tor 
Aristotle says, "being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by 
aotualizing itself it makes a man happy."29 
It is this oonoeption of the contemplative activity of the soul 
whioh forms a seoond view of the nature of the highest good for man. 30 "If 
happiness is aotivity in accordance with virtue," he says, reiterating what 
he has already established,3l "it is reasonable that it should be in accord-
ance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing In us. 
Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought 
to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and 
divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in 
us, the aotivity of this in acoordanoe with its proper virtue will be perfeot 
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happiness. n32 This activity~ he decides, is that of the contempla.ive soul~ 
and the truly happy life is the oontemplative life. For it is the contem-
plative activity which most eminently possesses the perfections character-
istic of man's highest good. It is the aotivity of the best element of human 
nature exercised on the best knowable objectsfit is the most continuous~ tor 
man can oontemplate truth more continously than he can~ anything; it is 
completed by the purest and most enduring pleasures;33 it is selt-sufticient 
• 
to the extent that the philosopher in oontemplating truth is, ot all men, 
least needtul of the company of other men or ot an abundance of worldly 
goods; it is most ot all loved for its own sake since nothing is produoed by 
contemplation; and it is dependent on leisure and peace tor its best funotion 
ing. It these attributes belong to contemplation and likewise all the other 
attributes ascribed to the activity of the happy man who is supremely happy. 
it follows that reason exercised in the contemplative activity and allowed a 
complete term of life is the oomplete happiness for man. 34 
say: 
Yet Aristotle, having achieved the end of this inquiry~ goes on to 
But suoh a life would be too high tor man; tor it is not 
in so tar as he is man that he will live so~ but in so tar 
as something divine is present in him; and by so muoh as 
this is superior to our oomposite nature is its aotivity 
superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind 
ot virtue. If reason is divine, then. in oomparison with 
man, the lite according to it is divine in comparison with • 
human lite. But we must not tollow those who advise us~ 
being men. to think of human things, and being mortal~ of 
mortal things, but must. so tar as we oan~ make ourselves 
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in aocordance 
with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, 
muoh more does it in power and worth surpass everything. 
This would seem, too. to be each man himself, sinoe it is 
the authoritative and better part of him. It would be 
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strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his .' 
self but that of something else. And what we said before 
will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by 
nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, 
therefore, the life according to reason is best and 
p1easantest, since reason more than anything else 1s man. 
This life therefore is also the happiest.35 
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This being true, only secondarily happy is t~e~life of moral virtue and prac-
tical wisdom; but because man is a man, because he has passions arising trom 
the lower element ot his composite nature, beoause he needs health, tood, and 
• 
other attention tor the maintenanoe ot his whole nature, and because he be-
longs to the society ot men, the activities ot the morally virtuous lite 
befit his composite nature and his human estate. But happiness belongs in 
the truest, highest, and most divine sense to the philosopher; the happiness 
without qua1itication good for man is the contemplation of truth. 36 
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Chapter VI 
.' 
The Ultimate Good 
The concept of analogy which Aristotle employs to explain the faot 
that "good" is predicated of the various categories of being serves to unity 
.~ 
goods in the logical order. Ontologically, the unification of goods is 
aohieved by the conception of actuality or the complete reality as the good 
which is aimed at in any categorJr; and the sarr~proportion that exists among 
the categories of both being and good extends likewise to the actual beings 
that fall into them. In other words, substanoe, prior in being to all the 
other oategories, is prior also from the standpoint of good and is that to 
whioh both the being and the good of the others are referred. But another 
unity of goods lies in the order of substanoes; for while Aristotle focuses 
his attention on the good proper to each substance in the natural order, he 
does not allow that the universe as he has painted it with its various dis-
tinct goods finds its suffioient reason for attaining the good in the varioda 
genera of beings that it comprises. Matter and form, potency and actuality 
as suoh give only a proximate explanation of the activity of all things in 
quest of their own good; the ultimate reason lies in a higher aotuality, an I 
eternal unmoved substanoe from which the final motivation of all things is 
derived. 
Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of substances comprising the 
whole of reality: the movable and perishable sensible substances of the sub-
lunary world, the movable and imperishable sensible substanoes of the heav-
ens, and the immovable and imperishable non-sensible substanoe. l The exist-
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ence of an eternal and unmoved substance he asserts to be necessa~'if there 
is to be any explanation of movement in the universe of sensible things. 
Motion itself is eternal and continuous because time. which is either "the 
same thing as movement or an attribute of movement."2 is eternal. For time 
cannot exist or even be thought of apart fro~~he moment whose character it 
is to be a kind of middle-point of time, both the end of past time and the 
beginning of future time; hence no moment can exist before which there was 
• 
not time or after which there will be no time. 3 But Aristotle demands an 
explanation of the perpetuity of motion. As far as the first class of sub-
stances is concerned, the sensible substances of the sub-lunary world, the 
inquiry deals with the kind of beings whose nature is such that they may 
possibly not be; for the fact of generation and destruction in physical 
phenomena implies that this substance at one time is and at another time is 
not. and hence coming-to-be and passing away belong to the things that "can 
be-and-not-be."4 
~ 
The inquiry into~the cause of perpetual coming-to-be of this kind 
of substance necessitates, however, a distinction of the meanings that may 
be attached to "cause" in this connection; for "cause" may refer to the 
matter, the for.m, or the "third originative source. u5 But insofar as matter 
and form are conoerned, while they are neoessary for an adequate explanation 
of motion, they fail sufficiently to account for gene ration. 6 An agen~ is 
necessary to explain the actualization of matter by for.m; and even if the 
latter is taken as the proximate agent which acts to infor.m matter, every 
last mover and every last agent, namely, that which is proximate to the moved 
or effected thing, imparts motion or acts by being itself moved or by itself 
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suffering aotion; it is, in other words, a moved mover or an affected agent, 
and needs a further mover or agent to explain its own causal efficaoy.7 
What is necessary, then, is the third originative cause whioh, in 
one sense of the term,S is the seoond olass of substanoes, the sensible sub-
stanoes of the heavens whose movement is primaiy, one, simple, and eternal, 
that is, oontinuous looomotion in a circle. 9 In respect of generation and 
corruption in the sub-lunary world the oause is the motion imparted by the 
• oombination of the motion of the fixed stars and the motion of the sun suoh 
that the sun moVing in an ecliptio path resulting from the motion proper to 
it and the motion imparted to it by the first heaven oauses the olass of 
things whioh may-or-may-not-be to oome-to-be and pass-away.lO 
But the eternal motion of the outer sphere and the sun is not yet 
enough; there is required another originative souroe to explain the perpetui-
ty of mo~ion of these imperishable things. For if the first heaven is eter-
nally moved, it requires a mover. Thus, Aristotle argues: "There is there-
fore also something whioh moves it. And sinoe that whioh is mover and moved 
is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being 
eternal, substanoe, and aotuality.nll For in any series of motions the 
oausal virtue exeroised by the last and the intermediate movers is derived 
from the oausality imparted by the first mover whioh, in respeot to the 
movement in question, must be itself unmoved. l2 But it is only the fi~al 
oause or the good whose oausality is that of an unmoved mover, and Aristotle 
oonoludes that the unmoved mover whioh is the principle upon whioh the 
heavens and the world of nature depend is the good at whioh all things aim. 
As the final oause it produoes motion, not by being moved as do the other 
I 
44 
oauses# but by being 10ved.13 It is not any or every final oause Whioh will 
thus explain the tendenoy toward the good in all things, but only the eternal 
and unmoved good which Aristotle oalls God. For every other good and, in 
fact, all other goods colleotively are such that they may perish and hence 
fail to account for the eternity and oontinult1 of the motion of whioh they 
are supposed to be the principles. As Aristotle argues the point: 
The fact that some things become and .others perish, and 
that this is so continuously, cannot~e caused by any of 
those things that, though they are unmoved# do not always 
exist: nor again can it be caused by any of those whioh 
move certain partioular things# while others move other 
things. The eternity and oontinuity of the process oan-
not be oaused either by anyone of them singly or by the 
sum of them# beoause this oausal relation must be eternal 
and neoessary # whereas the sum of these movents is infin-
ite and they do not all exist together. It is olear# then# 
that though there may be oountless instanoes of the perish-
ing of some prinoiples that are unmoved but impart motion# 
and though many things that move themselves perish and are 
sucoeeded by others that oome into being, and though one 
thing that is unmoved moves one thing While another moves 
another, nevertheless there is something that oomprehends 
them all# and that as something apart from eaoh one of 
them, and this it is that is the oause of the faot that 
some things are and others are not and of the continuous 
process of change: and this oauses the motion of the 
other movents, while they are the oauses of the motion of 
other things. Motion, then, being eternal, the first 
movent •••• will be eternal also. 14 
It is this good at which all things aim and in their striving 
account for the perpetual coming-to-be for their good. Having advanced the 
theory that the motion of the first heaven and the sun explain continuBus 
generation and corruption, Aristotle turns to the unmoved mover for the 
final explanation and says: 
And this oontinuity has a suffioient reason on our theory. 
For in all things, as we affir.m, Nature always strives 
after'the better.' Now 'being' (we have explained else-
I 
where the exaot variety of meanings we reoognize in this .' 
ter.m) is better than 'not-being': but not all things can 
possess 'being', sinoe they are too far removed from the 
'originative souroe.' God therefore adopted the remain-
ing alternative, and fulfilled the perfeotion of the uni-
verse by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the great-
est possible ooherenoe would thus be seoured to existenoe, 
beoause that 'ooming-to-be should ~t~elf come-to-be per-
petually' is the olosest approxima~i~n to eternal being. 15 
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No less evident is the same view when Aristotle turns to the generative soul 
in living beings: 
The aots in whioh it manifests itself are reproduotion and 
the use of food-reproduction, I say, beoause for any living 
thing that has reached its normal development and whioh is 
unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontane-
ous, the most natural aot is the produotion of another like 
itself, an animal produoing an animal, a plant a plant, in 
order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in 
the eternal and divine ••••• Since then no living thing is 
able to partake in what is eternal and divine by uninter-
rupted continuance (for nothing perishable oan for ever 
remain one and the same), it tries to achieve that end in 
the only way possible to it, and suocess is possible in 
varying degrees; so it remains not indeed as the self-
same individual but continues its existence in something 
~ itself -- not numerically but specifioally one. IS 
And, again, as to the mode of this imitation of the divine in the case of 
animal generation he sums up his position: 
Now (1) some existing things are eternal and divine whilst 
others admit of both existenoe and non-existenoe. But (2) 
that which is noble and divine is always, in virtue of its 
own nature, the cause of the better in suoh things as admit 
of being better or worse, and what is not eternal does ad-
mit,of existenoe and non-existenoe, and oan partake in the 
better and the worse.' And (3) soul is better than body, 
and the living, having soul, is thereby better than the 
lifeless which has none, and being is better than not-being, 
living than not living. These, then, are the reasons of the 
generation of animals. For since it is impossible that suoh 
a class of things as animals should be of an eternal nature, 
therefore that which oomes into being is eternal in the only 
way possible. Now it is impossible for it to be eternal as 
an individual (though of course the real essence of things 
I 
is in the individual) -- were it suoh it would be eternal.--
but it is possible for it as a speoies.17 
Thus it appears that the universal aiming at the final good whioh is the 
unmoved mover is at onoe the aiming of every being at its own good; the 
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striving for participation in the eternal and divine good is preoisely only 
•• 
another side of the striving of eaoh thing for the aotuality or the good 
proper to its own potentiality. When Aristotle says that "not all things oan 
possess 'being' sinoe they are too far removed irom the 'originative souroe'.' 
he is stating 6 though in a somewhat infrequent mode of expression. the exaot 
differenoe he finds between substances which are imperishable, henoe eternal 
and divine 6 and substanoes whioh are perishable. It is the latter which are 
oontingent and henoe only potentially existent, and on this basis Aristotle 
finds himself able to argue the priority of actuality over potentiality "in a 
stricter sense" even than on the basis of actuality as the end of potential-
ity.lS For the eternal thing is in respect of its substanoe imperishable and 
oonsequently is in the full sense nOlpotential to not being. whereas the ~ 
potentiality of the perishable thing affects its very sUbstanoe.19 In oon-
sequenoe, this kind of substance oan never attain to the "being" whioh ohar-
aoterizes the things whioh are eternal; for the degree in whioh they are I 
actual, always implying the potentiality for substantial destruction. they 
are distantly removed from the degree in whioh the eternal Doriginative 
. 
souroes" are aotual. The degrees, then, in whioh they may imitate the actu-
ality of the eternal substanoe is proportioned to the measure in which they 
realize the potentialities proper to their own natures, and this imitation is 
consequently the realization of their good by the exercise of their proper 
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funotions. The "being" or the aotuality for which all things stri~. the 
good at which they aim. oan thus be realized in only an approximation to the 
eternal aotuality and the eternal good. The ultimate aotuality and the 
ultimate good is eternal; but the eternity whioh it is possible tor natural 
substanoes to achieve is only the eternity or the species tor the very reason 
that individually each natural is one "whose 'substanoe' is suoh that it is 
essentially oapable of not-being."20 
The oase is perhaps less clear with regard to the highest good at 
whioh all men aim, but in last analysis it is nonetheless the same. The 
aotualization of man's highest potenoy is the activity of the contemplative 
life, and this above all is the exeroise of the intelleotual function proper 
to man. It is no less an approximation to the eternal actuality; and just as 
all other beings strive toward the eternal good by the exercise of their 
proper funotions. so must man. as far as he oan. strive toward immortality by 
"straining every nerve" to live in aooordanoe with the divinest element in 
him. his oontemplative soul by "thinking and being wise." For this is the 
activity of God,2l the most blessed and happiest of all things, who has no 
need of moral virtue sinoe the oiroumstances ot virtuous aotion are trivial 
and unworthy ot divinity. "The aotivity of God, whioh surpasses all others 
in blessedness, must be oontemplative; and of human aotivities, therefore, 
that whioh most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness."~2 And 
the life of the oontemplative man is thus the highest imitation of God possi-
ble to the perishable beings of the earth: 
He who exercises his reason and oultivates it seems to be 
both in the best state of mind and most dear to the gods. 
For if the gods have any oare for human affairs, as they 
I 
are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that the¥ 
should delight in that whioh is best and most akin to them 
(i.e. reason) and that they should reward those who love 
and honor this most, as caring for the things that are dear 
to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all 
these attributes belong most of all to the philosopher is 
manifest. He, therefore. is the dearest to the gods. And 
he who is that will presumably be also the happiest; so 
that in this wa~ too the philosoph8~ill more than any 
other be happy. 3 
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It is thus that in the first and eternal good Aristotle unifies the 
striving of every individual being in the uni~se. for it is in the striving 
to realize the perfeotion of their own natures that the neoessary and eternal 
divinity is their aim. But the unity of the goods under the unmoved mover 
implies a further unity of goods among themselves. for Aristotle feels at 
least that the desire of all things for the highest good oonduces to the 
good of the ensemble of natural things: 
We must consider also in whioh of two ways the nature of 
the universe oontains the good and the highest good. wheth-
er as something separate and by itself. or as the order of 
the parts. Probably in both ways. as an army does; for its 
good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more 
in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it 
depends on him. And all things are ordered together some-
how, but not all alike, -- both fishes and fowls and plants; 
and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do 
with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered 
together to one end, but it is as in a house, where the 
freemen are least at liberty to act at random. but all 
things or most things are already ordained for them, while 
the slaves and the animals do little for the common good, 
and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort 
of prinoiple that oonstitutes the nature of each. I mean, 
for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved 
into their elements, and there are other functions simi-
larly in whioh all share for the good of the whole. 24 
Only in the last good, then, does Aristotle find reason in the whole uni-
verse, in the order manifested in the aiming of all things at their proper 
I 
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and proximate actuality or good and in the adaptation ot beings to ene 
another. Even it it is only the tact that the corruption ot one substance 
is the generation of another. 25 the order inherent in the nature ot things 
is apparent. Thus it is that the end and the good for which all beings are 
destined to strive furnishes the last angwer~~the problem or the good in 
the philosophy or Aristotle. 
• 
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Notes and References 
.' 
All quotations and references are from The Works of Aristotle 
Translated into English under the edito~ip of W:-D. Ross, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Chapter I 
1. Ethioa Nichomachea I, i~ 1094 a 1-3. 
2. Categoriae v. 2 a 11-12. 
3. ib. 2 a 34. 
4. ib. 2 a 13-18. 
5. ib. 2 b 15-16. Aristotle does not restrict the charaoteristio of 
individuality to primary substances alone, for suoh things as a 
oertain point of gramr~tioal knowledge in the mind or a oertain 
whiteness inhering in its proper subjeot are likewise individual. 
Categ. ii, 1 a 9, 25-29. But these individual qualifications 
enter the Categoriae apparently only to fill out the scheme of 
things present in or not present in a subject and or predicable 
of or not predioable of a subject. Since they are singulars they 
are henceforth neglected. Their individuality causes no confusion 
with substanoes inasmuch as they require a subject. 
6. Metaphysica VII, xiii, 1038 b 8-14. Roman numerals will be used 
throughout to designate the books of the Metaphysics, counting 
as book II such that there will be fourteen books in all. 
7. ib. b 15. 
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8. ib. b 36-37. Even secondary substanoes, or the species and genera, 
indicate a quality, but nwith reference to a substance." Categ. v, 
3 b 19. cf. Met. III, vi, 1003 a 7-8; De Sophisticis Elenohis xxii, 
178 b 38-l79-a-lO. Aristotle devotes the remainder ot Met. VII, 
xiii to further arguments fram the point of view of ma1c:Iiig species 
or genera primary substanoes, with the P1atonio viewpoint in mind 
explicitly and VII, xiv entire to the critioism of the Ideas in 
light of them. In sum, they come to the argument of Met. III, vi, 
1003 a 9-11: "If we are to allow that a common predicate is a 'this' 
and a single thing, Soorates will be several animals -- himself and 
'man' and 'animal', if each of these indioates a 'this' and a sin-
gle thing." But since the Good would not be considered as a species 
or genus of substanoe, these arguments are not to our purpose. 
9. Met. VII, xvi, 1040 b 23-27. And if being and unity are not sub-
I 
stanoes by reason of their universality, a fortiori neither !s any 
other universal; for being and unity, as "attributes that follow 
everything," are the most universal of terms. 
10. Met. I, ix, 990 b 30. 
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11. Met. VII, xvi, 1040 b 28. of. XIII. x, 1086 b 16-19: "If we do not 
~pose substanoes to be separate, and in the way in whioh individ-
ual things are said to be separate, we Shall destroy substanoe in 
the sense in whioh we understand ·substanoe'." Aristotle says that 
the Platonists "gave separate existenoe to these universally predi-
cated substanoes, so that it followed that universals and individ-
uals were almost the same sort of thing." XIII, ix. 1086 b 10-11 • 
• 
12. !!!. I, ix, 991 b 1-3. 
13. To the argument that a universal indicates only a "such" (vide p. 50, 
n. 8) Aristotle adds that otherwise, that is, if it were taken to 
indicate a "this", "many difficulties follow and especially the 
'third man'." 1039 a 2. The reference is to the usual objections 
to the "one-over-many" prooedure of the Platonio dialeotic and to 
his own summary oriticism in~. I, ix. 
14. This is Aristotle's thought not in so many words in Categ. v., 
where, as regards seoondary substance, the species is considered 
to be "more truly substantial" than the genus for the reason that 
the latter, being too general, is further removed from the primary 
substanoe. 2 b 6-14. 
15. Categ. v, 2 b 28-37. 
Chapter II 
1. Aristotle notes parenthetioally. "whioh is the reason why they did 
not maintain the existence of an Idea embracing all numbers." Cf. I 
Met. XIII. vi. on the various forms the number theory took in the 
Acedemy. The reason is obscure; but in his short history of the 
origin of the theory of the Ideas Aristotle points out that while 
Soorates for the first time employed induction from particulars to 
a universai, Plato, with his Heraclitean distrust of changing sen-
sible things. gave separate existence to"the universals or the 
definitions" of Soorates, so that it followed for him "almost by 
the same argument" that there was a sUbsistent one-over-many not 
only of the ethical oonoepts of Soorates but of all things spoken 
of universally in whioh the individuals were said to partioipate. 
He notes that "partioipation" is only another name for the Pyth-
agorean "imitation of n~bers" and that while the Pythagoreans 
made all things numbers. Plato made his entities separate beoause 
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of "his inquiry in the region of definitions" (Met. I. vi. 9a7 b 32) 
and. with referenoe to the Platonist in general:-Deoause of the 
"abstraot oharaoter of their inquiry." (Met. XII. i, 1069 a 28) It 
would seem. then. that the oharaoter of definitions whioh the uni-
versals possessed was the reason why the Platonists would not admit 
priority and posteriority in the predication of the substantialized 
Ideas. for the definition is always univooal. The writer of the 
Eudemian Ethios is more explioit; he prefaces his criticism of the 
Platonic Good with the remark that a distussion of the Ideas belongs 
for the most part to logioal inquiry beoause it inVolves the rela-
tionship of the universal term and the individuals of whioh it is 
predicated. (I, viii, 1217 b 16-19) The burden of the oritioism in 
both works is, oonsequently, from the standpoint of predioation • 
• 2. Aristotle uses for the purposes of illustration only the oategories 
of substanoe and relation inasmuoh as relation provides him with the 
most obvious example of posterior being. Relation is, he remarks 
parenthetioally here, "like an aooident and offshoot of being." 1096 
a 12. Elsewhere he says more emphatioally. apropos to the indefinite 
dyad of the great and the small, "what is relative is least of all 
things a kind of entity or substanoe, and is posterior to quantity 
and quality." Cf. Met. XIV, i, 1088 a 22-23, where substanoe. quan-
tity, quality, and relation are taken apparently as exhaustive of 
the oategories. 
3. Eth. Nio. I, vi. 1096 a 17-29. Aristotle adds other oritioisms whioh 
~not oonoern us here: that a single idea of the Good would neoessi-
tate a single soienoe of the good; that "good-in-itself" and "this 
good" would not be different in the respeot that they are good; that 
the eternity of the good is not argument for its betterness; that, ~ 
insofar as the ethioal good is oonoerned, the Ideal Good would not 
be aohievable; and that, insofar as the aotual prooedure of the 
soienoes is oonoerned, neither do they regard it as a pattern to aid 
them in aohieving their aotually attainable goods, whioh is an im-
probable state of affairs if suoh a pattern does exist, nor does it 
seem probable that it should be an aid sinoe they are oonoerned with I 
partioulars. He also answers a supposed distinotion oounter to his 
oritioism, i.e. that goods are either those pursued for their own 
sake or those pursued as useful to them; for it is evident that even 
those goods whioh are oommonly pursued for their own sake differ in 
respeot of their goodness and henoe could not fall into a single. 
class of whose individuals good would be univooally predioated, and 
that if the Idea of the Good is alone good per se, it would be 
empty, that is, it oould contribute nothing to partioular goods. 
1096 a 29-1097 a 14. 
4. lb. 1096 all. 
5. lb. 1096 b 27-31. 
53 
6. Aristotle ohooses "quality" as exemplifying the likeness. 
7. Cf. Categ. i, 1 a 1-15 on univooal and equivooal names. 
8. Met. IV, ii, 1003 b 6-10; of. VII, i, 1028 a 9-b 2; iv, 1030 a 21-27, 
a-33-b 3; IV, 1003 a 32-b 6; for the enumeration of the oategories ot. 
V, vii, 1017 a 23-30; Categ. ii-ix. 
9. Not univooally, as his critioism of P~~ has indioated (vide supra, 
pp. 5-6, nor equivocally beoause it does not belong to things "which 
chance to have the s~e name." vide supra, p. 6.) 
Chapter III 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
~. I, iii, 983 a 32. 
lb. vii, 988 b 6. 
lb. ix, 992 a 30. 
~. V, xvii, 1022 a 8. ot. Ph~Sioa II, ii, 194 a 30-33, Where he 
critioises the pun on "end", " or not every stage that is last 
claims to be an end, but only that which is best." ct. also Met. 
V, xvi, 1021 b 28. 
It was because thinkers could not entrust the goodness and beauty 
which things manifest in their being and becoming to matter or to 
chance and spontaneity that they were at length "torced by the truth 
itself" to inquire into some cause other than the material. Met. • 
I, iii, 984 b 8-15. On chance and spontaneity, vide intra, PP:-24-25. 
ct. Met. V, i "Beginning". Here Aristotle oalls the tinal oause a 
"beginning", for ·"the good and the beautiful are the beginning both 
ot the knowledge and of the movement of many things." 1013 a 23. 
He does not say the movement of all things, for he keeps in mind 
the movements initiated by chanoe-ind spontaneity ot whioh the good, 
as the result aimed ~, oannot be oalled the beginning. 
7. ~. V, xvi, 1021 b 24. 
8. lb. ii, 1013 b 26-27. 
9. Phys. II, iii, 195 a 23-25. 
10. !!!. I, ii, 982 b 4-10. 
11. ~.~. I, ii, 1094 a 27-b 11. 
I 
12. lb. 1094 a 10-15. Cf. also Phys. II, ii, 194 a 38-b 8. 
.' 
13. Met. III, ii, 996 b 1-12 
14. Met. III, i1, 996 a 22-28. The same argument is repeated in XI, i, 
1059 a 35-39 where it is reiterated that the final oause or the 
nature of the good is found "in the field of action and movement," 
and that it is the nature of the end to be a first mover whereas 
"in the case of things unmovable there~!' nothing that moved them 
first. " 
15. ~. I, ix, 990 b 1-9; 992 a 28. 
16. lb. 991 a 19-21. 
17. Met. V, xxiv. 
18. Met. I, ix, 991 a 21-26. 
19. lb. 992 a 24-26. 
20. "The proximate prinoiple of all things are the 'this' which is 
proximate in aotuality, and another whioh is proximate in poten-
tiality. The universal oauses, then, of whioh we spoke [soil. 
matter form, privation, and agent] do not exist. For in regard 
to the last mentioned oause it is the individual whioh is the 
originative prinoiple of the individuals. For while man is the 
originative prinoiple of man universally, there is no universal 
man, but Peleus is the originative prinoiple of Aohilles, and 
your father of you, and this partioular b of this partioular ba, 
though b in general is the originative prinoiple of ba taken --
without-qualifioation •••• and those oauses of things in the same 
speoies are different, not in speoies, but in the sense that the 
oauses of different individuals are different, your matter and 
form and moving oause being different from mine." Met. XII, v, 
1071 a 18-29. This is not explioitly an argument against the 
Platonists, but its implioations are relevant. 
54 
21. In regard to things said to share in Ideas, cf. Met. I, ix, 991 b 3-9; 
in regard to substanoes, Met. VII, iii, 1033 b 25-1034 a 8; in regard 
to natural objeots, Met. XII, iii, 1070 a 18-30; in regard to t~ngs 
that oome-to-be, of.-n8 Generatione et Corruptione II, ix, 335 b 10-15, 
18-24. -- --
22. Aristotle here merely points out that "this argument, whioh first 
Anaxagoras and later Eudoxus and oertain others used, is very 
easily upset; for it is not diffioult to oollect many insuperable 
objeotions to suoh a view." ~. I, ix, 991 a 16-18. 
A "oomposition" in the sense in whioh Aristotle uses the term to 
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describe the Anaxagorean theory of the unity of a subject an~'its 
qualifioation is, loosely speaking, a mixture. To be a composition 
the component parts must be aotually present in the whole in their 
own identity and separable from the whole. This is the oharacter-
istio of the homoeomeries, although Aristotle notes that Anaxagoras 
held that complete separation will not take plaoe. But he says in 
oriticism: "The statement that complete separation will never take 
place is correot enough, though Anaxag9F~S is not fully aware of 
what it means. For affectations are i~deed inseparable. If then 
oolors and states had entered into the mixture, and if separation 
took plaoe, there would be a 'white' or a 'healthy' whioh was nothing 
but white or healthy, i.e. was not the predicate of a subject." 
PhIs. I, iv, 188 a 5-9. That Aristotle would consider this criticism 
va id enough against any theory which wo~d place the Ideas in things 
by way of composition is clear. .---
23. Vide supra, p. 10.So Aristotle goes on to say that the "modern 
thinkers" have identified mathematics with philosophy -- for the 
reason, no doubt, that there is no final cause among mathematical 
entities inasmuch as there is no motion. 
24. Met. XII, x, 1075 a 38-39. 
25. Met. I, vii, 988 b 6-16. 
26. For incidental causality, cf. ~. V, ii, 1013 b 34-1014 a 6. 
27. Met. XII, x, 1075 b 18-19. Although Aristotle mentions only a 
"superior principle", we inter from the context, i.e. the summary 
examination of the role of the good in other philosophers, that he 
means the final oause. It is not very likely that he would allow 
the proximate agent at least to be superior to the proximate form 
in any oausality, and he oan hardly be unaware of the transcendent 
character given to the Idea of the Good by Plato; he must, there-
fore, have in mind a principle superior even to the Good in its 
causality. For the point of the argument is that even if the 
Platonists posit the Good as a principle of the participating and 
the ooming-to-partioipate of things in the Ideas, the Good is no 
less an Idea than the others and, in this muoh at least, ie not 
superior to them in the mode of causality whioh the Ideas are said 
to exercise. It would be required, then, that a superior principle 
explain why things that are called good participate and oome-to-
participate in the Good. 
28. Met. IX, i, 1046 a 11-12. 
29. Met. V, xii, 1019 a 15-20. 
30. Met. IX, i, 1046 a 4-28. Aristotle likewise distinguishes between 
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rational and non-rational potencies of acting. Rational pote»eies 
belong only to those living beings which are possessed of the ration-
al part of the soul, whereas non-rational potenoies belong also to 
non-living things whioh laok the rational soul. ~~, 1046 a 37-b 3. 
The difference between the two is that the latter is capable of pro-
ducing only a single effect; and, moreover, when the being possessing 
the non-rational potency meets the agent in the manner appropriate 
to the potency, it is neoessary that the. agent act and the patient 
suffer. The former, however, is capabre~of produoing contrary 
effects, as the agent possessing the medical art, for example, can 
produce both disease and health; and the agent is not determined to 
produce its effects when the object upon which it can act is present, 
for, since the effects are oontraries, it would produce contrary 
effects at the same time. In this case, ·tn additional determinant, 
desire or will, is required to decide which of the two effeots is 
to be produoed. v, 1047 b 35-1048 all. 
31. Ib. vi, 1048 a 32. 
32. lb. 1048 a 25-b 8. 
33. Which "in a sense" is the most fundamental point of view from which 
"prior" and "posterior" are considered. ct. Met. V, xi, esp. 1019 
all; comp. Categ. xii, 14 a 29-34. 
34. Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 4-10. 
35. Vide supra, p. 17. For the form as end, vide infra, p.23. 
36. Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 31-34. 
37. Ib. vi, 1048 b 25-28. 
38. lb. viii, 1050 a 23. 
Chapter IV 
1. Met. IX, viii, 1050 a 16-19. For the senses in which a thing is said 
to be in another, of. Phys. IV, iii, 210, a 15-24; as in its good or 
its end, a 22-23. -
2. Meteoro1ogica IV, xii, 390 a 10-19. 
3. ~. IX, viii, 1049 b 9. 
4. Cf. De Caelo II, iii, 268 a 8: "Everything which has a function exists 
for its function." 
I 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
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ihYS. II, i, 192 b 22-23. By adding the qualification "in vi,rtue of 
tself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" Aristotle in one 
stroke excludes artificial things from the sphere of the natural and 
chanoe and spontaneity from being natural oauses. Artifioia1 things 
aot and suffer action, but they aot and suffer not in virtue of what 
they are as artificial things but in virtue of the natural bodies of 
whioh they are oomposed and which as suoh are merely ooncomitent to 
artifioial things as suoh. A bed, for ,instanoe, might sprout if it 
were planted or it may be burned, but·oftly in virtue of the aotive 
and passive potencies, respeotively, of the wood of which it is made. 
For "incidental oauses" of. Met. V, ii, 1013 b 30-1014 a 6; Phys. II, 
ii, 195 a 33-b 11. For ohance-and spontaneity, vide infra, p~4-25. 
For the most oomplete enumeration and extlioation of the various 
senses of "nature" of • .!!:!:.. V, iv. 
Ph{S. II, i, 193 b 7-8. On the expression "to be what it is" of. 
Me • V, iv, 1014 b 35-1015 a 11-12: "'Nature' means the essenoe of 
natural objects ••••• By an extension of meaning from this sense of 
'nature' every essenoe in general has oome to be called a 'nature', 
beoause the nature of a thing is one kind of essenoe." 
Met. V, iv, 1015 a 5, in respeot of the "primary and striot" sense 
~nature", i.e. form or essence. 
lb. 1015 a 16. 
10. Phys. II, vii, 198 a 25-29. 
11. 
12. 
Vide supra, p. 18. 
Cf. Phys. I, ix, where matter is said to "desire" the form. This 
mode~expression oannot be taken apart from its oontext. Aristotle 
here is purposively using the language which the Platonism he is 
critizing suggests to him. 
Admitting with them [scil. the Platonists] that there is 
something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there 
are two other prinoiples, the one contrary to it [scil. 
the privation of the form], and the other [scil. mattetj 
such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it. 
But the consequenoe of their view is that the contrary 
desires its own distinotion. Yet the form cannot desire 
itself, for it is not defeotive; nor oan the contrary 
desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The 
truth is that what desires the form is the matter, as the 
female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful -- only 
the ugly or the female not per!! but l!! aocidens. 192 a 
17-24. 
I 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
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The point last made is that the ugly and the female relative ~o the 
beautiful and the male are inoomplete realizations of the form in-
its matter and henoe desire the latter as the inoomplete may be said, 
in general, to desire oompletion or that which has the full reality 
of its speoies; but they desire not as things whose very nature is 
to be incomplete, but as things whioh are per aooidens inoomplete in 
the sense of being defioient in the respeot of the exoellence proper 
to the species. Cf. Met. V, xvi, passim. esp. 1021 b 15-17. Matter, 
on the other hand, as-raoking any detefm~nation, is per se inoomplete 
and henoe desires the form by its very nature. -----
~.VII, xvii, 1041 a 31-32. 
Phys. II, vii, 198 b 9. 
Phy;s. II, v-vi. 
lb. viii, 198 b 33-199 a 8. 
17. De Gen. et Cor. II, vi, 333 b 5-15. 
18. lb. 333 b 19. 
19. ~. VII, vii, 1032 a 25-b 24; De Partibus Animalium I, i, 639 b 17-32 
20. The parallelism is so striot that Aristotle even ventures to say that 
if the produots of art were made by nature or if natural produots were 
made by art, the prooess by whioh either aooomplishes its end would 
remain the same. Phys. II, viii, 199 a 13-15. 
21. Phys. II, viii, 199 a 26-33. 
22. lb. ix, 200 a 13-14; of. De Part. Anim. I, i, 639 b 21ff. The reason 
why simple or absolute necessity is-eioluded from nature and from art 
is that the produots of nature and art are suoh that they mayor may 
not be. Absolute neoessity wherein the oonsequent follows neoessarily I 
from the anteoedent, as well as oonversely, ooours only in eternal 
things where it is absolutely neoessary that the oonsequent be. It 
would be only on the assumption that a man or a house must oome to 
be that either should neoessarily result from the proper disposition 
of the matter in whioh they are realized. Cf • .£!~. ~.£2!.. II, 
xi, 337 b 10-338 b 6. 
23. Phys. II, i, 192 b 9-23. 
24. De Caelo IV, iii, 310 a 32-b 1. Thus fire moves toward the upper 
plaoe and earth toward the lower, and at the end of the movement 
the upper and lower plaoes belong respectively to eaoh, for the 
reason that suoh movement is the aotualization of a proper paten-
tiality at the completion of which the proper end is attaine~; just 
as the healable, Aristotle illustrates, when moved attains health 
and not a greater bulk. For the moat part, the examples he chooses 
are drawn from art, but he notes the difference. That which can be 
healed qua healable needs ordinarily an agent other than itself; 
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but the elements, a propos to the example in question, have the 
source of their movement, the actualization of their potenoies, 
within themselves. "The reason," Ari~to~le remarks, "why the heavy 
and the light appear more than these t'h:i?!gs to contain wi thin them-
selves the source of their movements is that their matter is nearest 
to being. This is indioated by the faot that looomotion belongs to 
bodies only when isolated from other bodies, and is generated last 
out of the several kinds of movement; in order of being then it will 
be first." lb. IV, iii, 310 b 32-311 a ~. 
25. De Caelo IV, iii, 311 a 1-6. Cf. De Gen. et Cor. II, viii: "Eaoh of 
them tends to be borne toward its OW'n-prace: but the 'figure' -- i.e. 
the 'form' -- of them all is at the limits." 335 a 20-22. 
26. Every compound is oomposed of all the elementary bodies. 
et Cor. II, viii, passim. 
Cf. De Gen. 
27. It is enough to explain the movements of their unoompounded parts in 
order to understand the movements of the oompounds. Cf. De Cae10 IV, 
ii, 309 b 20-21; iv, 311 a 30-35. 
28. E!Anima II, i, 412 a 29. 
29. lb. iv, 415 b 13. 
30. lb. 415 b 14. 
31. lb. 415 b 15-20. Cf. £!~. ~. I, v, 645 b 14-19. 
32. lb. 416 b 18. 
33. lb. 416 b 23-25. Cf. De Caelo, II, xiv: "It is right to oa1l any-
thing that which nature-intends it to be and which belongs to it, 
rather than whioh it is by oonstraint and oontrary to nature," 297 
b 22-23. 
34. ~ Generatione Animalium, II, vi, 742 a 30-32. 
35. £! Anima, III, xii, 434 a 30-435 a 10. 
36. De Inoessu Anima1ium, ii, 704 b 11-17 
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Chapter V .' 
1. De Part. Anim. II, x, 656 a 8-9. Cf. IV, x, 686 a 29-30 J E.!~. 
Anim. II,-rrr, 736 b 28. 
2. E!~. I, i, 403 a 10-11. 
lb. II, i, 413 a 3-7. 
4. lb. III, iv, 429 b 22-23. 
5. lb. I, iv, 408 b 18-29; II, ii, 413 b 24-29. 
6. lb. III, v, 430 a 23. The immortality atd eternity whioh Aristotle 
finds thus to belong to the aoting power of the human soul is the 
reason he speaks of it as "divine" or "more divine" than any other 
soul; for the term "divine" to the Greeks was applied to anything 
aocording to the relative long lastingness of its life. Aristotle 
himself points out this usage: "All.men have some conoeption of the 
nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existenoe of gods at 
all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting the highest 
plaoe to the deity, surely because they suppose that immortal is 
linked with immortal and regard any other supposition as inoonoeiv-
able." De Caelo 1, iii, 270 b 6-9. "This word 'duration' possessed 
a divine-Signifioanoe for the anoients, for the fulfillment whioh 
includes the period of life of any oreature, outside of whioh no 
natural development oan fall, has been oalled duration. On the 
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same prinoiple the fulfillment of the whole heaven, the fulfillment 
whioh inoludes all time and infinity, is 'duration' -- a name based 
upon the the faot that it is always -- duration immortal and divine .... 
I, ix, 279 a 23-28. "The anoients gave to the Gods the heaven or 
upper plaoe, as being alone immortal." II, i, 284 a 12. "The 
aotivity of God is immortality, i.e. eternal life." II, iii, 286 
a 9. 
7. Eth. Nio. 1, ii, 1094 a 18-22. Cf. Met. V for the impossibility of 
an-infinite series of final oauses, ii, 994 a 8-9, b 9-16. 
8. ~.~. I, vi~ 1096 b 32-1097 a 14. 
9. lb. vii, 1097 a 24-b 21. 
10. lb. vii, 1097 b 25-32. 
11. Although oalling it the "aotive life" identifies it as seoond 
aotuality, i.e. the exercise of the rational potency. Vide 
supra, pp. 18-20. 
12. Vide supra, p. 16, n. 30. 
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13. Eth. Nic. I, vii, 1097 b 23-1098 a 19. Aristotle insists that 
happiness is an "aotivity" of the soul because aotivity or action 
denotes "life" in its more proper sense. 1098 a 7. For activity 
as the proper sense of actuality, vide supra, pp.18-20. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
When Aristotle turns to find his own view in harmony with that of 
others he conoludes likewise that happiness is aotivity. Goods 
relating to soul are properly and most truly goods) for while he 
agrees with the Pythagorean and P1ato~~division of goods into 
external goods, those of the body, and those of the soul, the 
identifioation of happiness with "oertain aotions and aotivities" 
allows the good for man to fall among goods of the soul rather than 
any other olass. viii, 1098 b 12-19. Moreover, the happy man is 
thought to live well and do well, and ha,piness must thus be a good 
living and a good aotion. 1098 b 20-22. Further, if the ohief good 
is plaoed merely in a state of mind, it is conoeivable that it may 
exist without produoing any good aotion at all, as when a man is 
asleep or otherwise inaotive; whereas one possessing happiness will 
aot and aot well by the very faot that it is itself an aotivit,y and 
the best for man. 1098 b 30-1099 a 6. 
lb. xiii, 1103 a 3. 
lb. II, ii, 1106 b 36-1107 a 2. 
lb. VI, i-ii, 1188 a 35-1139 b 13. 
lb. iv, 1140 b 5"'6, 20. 
lb. 1140 b 7. 
19. lb. vii, 1141 b 15. 
20. lb. x, 1143 a 8. 
21. lb. xii, 1144 a 7-9. 
22. lb. 1144 a 30-35. 
23. lb. xiii, 1144 b 30-31. 
24. lb. vi, 1140 b 31-1141 a 8. 
25. lb. iii, 1139 b 19-35. Cf. Aualytica Posteriora I, ii, 71 b 9-15. 
26. lb. vii, 1141 a 12-b 23. 
27. lb. xii, 1143 b 18-20, where this is advanoed as an objeotion and 
diffiou1ty. 
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28. lb. 1144 a 1-3. 
.' 
29. lb. 1144 a 5-6. That is, as a rational potenoy whose aotualization 
is in the exercise of the aotivity itself. Vide supra., pp. 18-20. 
30. There are apparently two views of the happy life in the Ethica 
Niohomaohea, the life of praotioal wisdom and the life of 
philosophic wisdom, of which Aristotle holds that the latter is 
the higher. The politioal philosophef" m, oalls the "arohiteot of 
the end, with a view to which we oall one thing bad and another 
good without qualification." VII, xi, 1152 b 2-3. But praotica1 
wisdom is not supreme over philosophio, for "to maintain its 
supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the 
gods beoause it issues orders about all -the affairs of the state." 
VI, xiii, 1145 a 10-11. 
In neglecting the problem of reoonoi1ation of the two 1i ves, our 
disoussion may appear to be an over-simp1ifioation; but this 
problem does not fall within the soope of our treatment of the 
good. 
31. Vide supra, p.32. 
32. Eth. Nio. X, vii, 1177 a 12-18. 
33. Pleasure, to Aristotle, is the oompletion of an activity, "as an end 
whioh supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower 
of their age;" and as long as the faoulty exeroising the aotivity is 
in its proper condition, its proper pleasure is involved in its 
fulfillment. Cf. Eth. Nic. X, iv, passim. esp. 1174 b 15-1175 a 3. M 
Pleasures differ a~rding to the aotivities of whioh they are the 
oompletion, and they are superior in the measure that their aotivities 
are superior. Cf. X, v, passim. esp. 1175 b 36-1176 a 3. 
34. lb. X, vii, 1177 a 12-b 25. 
35. lb. 1177 b 26-1178 a 8. 
36. lb. X, viii, passim. 
Chapter VI 
1. Met. XII, i, 1069 a 30-b 2; vi, 1071 b 3. This olassification 
corresponds to the division of things in the world into those 
whioh are always motionless, those always in motion, and those 
whioh admit of both motion and rest, the establishment of whioh 
is the oore of the argument of Phys. VIII, iii-ix. 
I 
2. Met. vi, 1071 b 9. Cf. Phys. VIII, i, where time is either ~he 
number of motion or itse~ kind of motion." 251 b 12. 
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3. Phys. VIII, i, 251 b 10-28. other arguments in the same place: to 
say-that motion had a beginning is to say that some ohange existed 
before the first ohange that would have brought either the mover or 
the movable into the particular oondition requisite to effect the 
first ohange; and to say that motion ~~l have an end is to say that 
some ohange will exist after the lastohAnge, for the last destructive 
agent itself will have to be destroyed. 251 a 8-252 a 4. The view 
that motion is not eternal is nothing less than "fantastic." 
4. De Gen. et Cor. II, ix, 335 a 33-b 5. 
5. De Gen. et Cor. II, x, 335 a 28-32. The last oause enumerated here 
is given asasecond cause along with matter in a similar distinction 
in I, iii, where the context is limited to the discussion of the same 
question from the point of view of the material oause alone. It is 
oalled "the source trom which, as we say, the process originates." 
318 a 1. In a 4-5 it is distinguished into something immovable 
through all time, the discussion of whioh Aristotle defers to the 
Metaphysics, and something always moved, which he leaves to the 
oontext we are now oonsidering. 
6. They "are not suffioient to bring things into being." lb. 335 a 32. 
7. De Gen. et Cor. I, vii, 324 a 25-34. Cf. Phys. VIII, v, passim. 
8. Cf. n.5, supra. 
9. ~. XII, vi, 1071 b 10-11. Cf. Phys. VIII, vii-ix on suoh movement. 
10. lb. 1072 a 9-18; ~ Gen. ~~. II, x, 336 a l5-b 24. 
11. lb. vii, 1072 a 23-25. 
12. Cf. Phys. VIII, v, for the oomplete development of this argument. 
13. ~. XII, vii, 1072 b 1-4. 
14. Phls. VIII, vi, 258 b 27-259 a 8. 
15. De Gen. et Cor. II, x, 336 b 27-35. 
16. ~ Anima II, iv, 415 a 25-b 7. 
17. De ~. ~. II, i, 731 b 24-37. 
18. Vide supra, p. 17. 
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19. ~. IX. viii, 1050 b 5-27. 
.' 
20. Cf. ~~. ~~. II, xi. 338 b 7-20. 
21. Cf.~. XII. vii, 1072 b 14-29; ix passim. 
22. ~.~. X, viii, 1178 b 22-23 
23. lb. 1179 a 23-32. 
24. ~. XII, x, 1075 a 12-24. 
25. Cf. De Gen. at Cor. I, iii, 318 a 14-319 b 2. The coming-to-be of one 
substance is-onry-the passing-away of antther and vice versa, genera-
tion and destruction being no more than two sides of the same phenome-
non. This is the reason that coming-to-be is perpetual from the point 
of view of the material cause. 
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